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very nearly with the "visceral theory" of Prof. James, but was formulated in ignorance of Prof. James's work.)

The thesis is supported by a wealth of detailed evidence drawn from the widely varying fields of zoölogy, physiology, anthropology, history, jurisprudence and philosophy.

As a scientific history of "the growth of our moral instinct" this book has two elements of weakness. In the first place, it is an apology and not strictly a history. Adam Smith's doctrine of "morality founded on sympathy" is assumed as a proposition to be demonstrated. Under such conditions an impartial investigation of the facts of moral evolution would be well nigh a superhuman task. In the second place the author's evident disregard of psychology is a grave defect. You scan the index in vain for a citation from a "simon pure" psychologist. This disregard is especially exasperating in view of the author's use of such indefinite psychological terms as "instinct" without even a provisional definition. His treatment, too, of sympathy is somewhat invertebrate. It is defined as "that general tendency which makes men grieve at the pains and rejoice in the pleasures of their fellows," "the capacity of contagiousness in emotion." The physiological conditions of sympathy are set forth with admirable and convincing thoroughness; but the psychological conditions, which can hardly be of less significance in the history of the progressive development of sympathy, are not mentioned. As a matter of fact, the history of the origin and growth of the moral instinct is essentially a chapter in the history of psychogenesis. In the hands of one not a psychologist the subject is bound to suffer.

More specific points of criticism are the failure to take account of the sex factor in the origin of sympathy, which seems to be ascribed wholly to parental instinct; and the practical ignoring of the heredity problem. The author seems to hold to the Darwinian doctrine of transmission. Weissmann is not mentioned.

On the whole this book adds little to clear thinking along the line of moral evolution; but on the other hand it has not a little of moral dynamic in itself. Its purpose is dogmatic, but the controversial temper is generally absent; and a kind of noble idealism permeates all the pages.

W. S. S.

Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals, by E. L. THORNDIKE. Monograph Supplement, No. 8, of the Psychological Review.

This monograph of 109 pages presents the results of a series of experiments conducted for two years on dogs, cats and chicks, with a view to ascertain the time required and mode in forming their mental associations, together with a determination of their delicacy, number and permanency.

The method used was to confine the animals in enclosures from which they could escape by some simple act, such as pulling at a loop of cord, pressing a lever, or stepping on a platform. The animals, as far as possible, were kept in a uniform state of hunger. This, together with the desire for freedom and discomfort in confinement, were the factors played upon throughout.

He found that the creatures could not learn to do any act from being put through it, "and that no association leading to an act could be formed unless there was included in the association an impulse of the animal's own. Learning, whether among domestic animals or their keepers, is a process in which the learner must shoulder the great bulk of the task.

The interpretations that will probably provoke discussion and

adverse criticism are the following: 1st, that animals, excepting primates, cannot and do not learn the simplest acts from seeing their fellows do them; 2nd, "that the elements in the associative processes are sense-impressions, plus a past 'impulse and act,' rather than between two sense-impressions, one past, and one present." He would argue, if I interpret him aright, that in order for the product of the associative processes to be advantageous to increase intelligence, one of the elements must be an impulse from the motor side as opposed to the idea which maintains that the associative elements in animal psychosis may be between sensations or even between memory images of an elaborate order. For those of us who have an abiding interest and faith in comparative psychology as an important auxiliary to the study of mind, the chief value of the paper lies in its testing a simple method whereby more of the facts of animal psychosis may be set forth.

L. W. KLINE.

A Primer of Psychology, by EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1898. Price, \$1.

A good elementary text-book is by no means easy to write; it is a most searching test both of the real condition of the science for which it is written and of the degree in which the writer has mastered his subject. To write up "results" for Archives or technical journals is one thing, to distil off the vital essence of a science for beginners is quite another. Such a book ought not to be a mere description of the "wonders" of the science in question, still less an abstract account of its theory; it must show the theory alive and luminous in phenomena actually present.

The peculiar merit of Prof. Titchener's primer is the successful attempt to do just this. The general treatment is not only concrete and sufficiently untechnical, but each of the fifteen chapters is followed by a section of "Questions and Exercises," intended to lead the student not only to the better comprehension of the text, but also to an intelligent observation of his own mental experiences. When practicable these observations are given an experimental form, and an appendix is devoted to a convenient list of apparatus and materials, with names and addresses of makers, and prices.

The book, however, covers a much wider field than that of laboratory psychology. After introductory chapters on the nature and methods of the science, the topics of sensation, feeling, and attention are taken up in that order, to be followed by those of perception, idea and association, emotion, simpler forms of action; then memory and imagination, thought and self-consciousness, sentiment, and complex forms of action; the work is concluded by a chapter on abnormal psychology, and another on animal and child psychology and the relation of psychology to ethics, logic and pedagogy. As will be seen from this list, the order of treatment is somewhat peculiar. In the reviewer's opinion it is not altogether happy,—certain logical and systematic advantages having been gained at the expense of a natural pedagogical approach.¹

The present state of psychological science is apparent in the varying interest of the chapters, those upon matters little touched as yet by the newer methods being painfully skeletonesque. For this, of course, the author cannot be held responsible. It is to be regretted, however, that he did not give more explicit attention to mental

¹It is perhaps fair to say that the plan is simpler than the chapter headings would suggest, being the usual threefold division treated successively at different levels of complexity: 1, Sensation, Feeling, Attention; 2, Perception (with idea and association), Emotion, Simple Action; 3, Higher Intellect, Sentiment, Complex Action.